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Abstract 
 
With tens of billions of new IoT devices being utilized, and the advent of quantum computing, 
our future and our security needs are rapidly changing. While IoT devices have  great potential 
to transform the way we live, they also have a number of serious problems centering on their 
security capabilities. Quantum computers capable of breaking today’s encryption are just 
around the corner, and we will need to securely communicate over the internet using the 
encryption of the future. Post-quantum public-key encryption and key-establishment algorithms 
may be the answer to address those concerns. This paper used the benchmarking toolkit 
SUPERCOP to analyze the performance of post-quantum public-key encryption and 
key-establishment algorithms on IoT devices that are using ARMv8 CPUs. The performance of 
the NIST round 2  algorithms were found to not be significantly different between the two 
ARMv8 devices.  
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Chapter I:​ ​Introduction 
Introduction 
Today’s network environment is seeing an exponential increase in the use of devices 
collectively known as the Internet of Things (IoT). These devices, such as sensors, medical 
devices, TVs, webcams, home thermostats, remote power outlets, lights, door locks, home 
alarms, etc., are all everyday objects that have been embedded with computing devices that 
allow them to send and receive data via the Internet, and also to be interconnected with each 
other. These IoT devices frequently operate on a Low power and Lossy Network (LLN), and 
their applications are often quite constrained. As production costs decrease, IoT devices are 
becoming more and more ubiquitous in all aspects of our lives.  
Many of the IoT devices use Advanced RISC Machine(ARM) processors. ARM is an 
instruction set for processors that uses the reduced instruction set computing (RISC) 
architecture. ARM cores are used in products ranging from smartphones, digital cameras, 
handheld game consoles, and single-board computers such as the Raspberry Pi. ARM 
processors have improved cost, power consumption, and heat dissipation compared to 
processors used in desktop computers (Aroca & Gonçalves, 2012). According to ARM Holdings 
CEO Simon Segars, in 2017 there has been 100 billion ARM-based chips shipped since 1991. 
ARM estimates that it will only take 5 years for them to ship the next 100 billion ARM-based 
chips, leading to their prediction that IoT devices will skyrocket into the hundreds of billions 
(Hughes, 2017). 
While IoT has great potential, it also has a number of serious problems centering on the 
security capabilities of the connected devices. Post-quantum public-key encryption and 
key-establishment algorithms may be the answer to address those concerns. Currently, there 
are algorithms for post-quantum public-key encryption and key-establishment that are 
9 
undergoing the second round of National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
evaluation. Of the 26 algorithms that made it to the second round, 17 of them are public-key 
encryption and key-establishment algorithms. “In 2020, NIST plans to either select finalists for a 
final round or select a small number of candidates for standardization” (Alagic et al., 2019, 
p.18).  
Problem Statement 
With the tens of billions of new IoT devices being utilized in the near future, they will 
need to be able to securely communicate over the internet using the encryption of the future. 
Tomorrow’s encryption algorithms must be able to function on today’s IoT devices. 
Nature and Significance of the Problem 
Security for today's IoT devices is actually a multifaceted issue. One of the most 
pressing issues is its lack of public-key encryption and key-establishment schemes, which 
leaves all the devices vulnerable to attack from hackers. “If one thing can prevent the Internet of 
things from transforming the way we live and work, it will be a breakdown in security” (Oxford 
dictionary, example sentence). This prophetic quote not only provides an eloquent warning, it 
perfectly sums up the significance of having adequate security for IoT devices. While adding 
current public-key encryption will be an acceptable short term security solution, it will fail to be 
proactive in addressing future security needs.  In the not too distant future, the advent of 
quantum computers capable of breaking today’s encryption will bring new security challenges, 
and left unaddressed, will render IoT devices vulnerable once again.  
It is imperative that those responsible for providing security for IoT Devices be forward 
thinking, and take into account how technologies will likely evolve. In order for IoT security to 
possess long term viability, algorithms must either be initially designed with post quantum 
security, or the applications must allow for algorithms to be easily replaced with ones that do 
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have post-quantum security (McKay et al., 2016). Public key cryptography can still be 
considered for inclusion if it can meet the necessary conditions, which include being robust 
against quantum attacks, and using a combination of general public key cryptographic schemes 
along with lightweight primitives, such as lightweight hash function. Unfortunately, “because the 
majority of modern cryptographic algorithms were designed for desktop/server environments, 
many of these algorithms cannot be implemented in the constrained devices used by these 
applications” (McKay et al., 2016, p. iii).  Either new algorithms must be created, or existing 
algorithms must be modified to fit in the constrained devices as well as meet the new standards 
for post-quantum public-key encryption and key-establishment. The performance of these 
algorithms need to be tested in other environments as well as the desktop/server environment. 
Objective of the Study 
The objective for this study is to use the SUPERCOP toolkit to collect performance data 
on post-quantum public-key encryption and key-establishment algorithms that are running on 
IoT devices using ARMv8 CPU architecture. The performance metrics collected for the 
key-encapsulation mechanisms include the number of cycles for generating a key pair, 
encapsulation of keys, and decapsulation of keys. The performance metrics collected for 
public-key cryptosystems include cycles to generate a key pair, to encrypt a short message, and 
to decrypt a short message. 
Study Questions/Hypothesis 
There will be no significant difference between the Raspberry Pi 3B+ and the Raspberry 
Pi 4 ARMv8 devices when measuring the benchmarked performance of public-key encryption 
and key-establishment algorithms using SUPERCOP. 
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Limitations of the Study 
This study is limited by the compatibility of the different post-quantum algorithm 
implementations with the SUPERCOP benchmarking toolkit. Not all of the post-quantum 
algorithm implementations in the second round of the NIST competition have public-key 
cryptosystems available for benchmarking in the SUPERCOP toolkit. Another limitation of this 
study is the C compiler compatibility to compile the post-quantum algorithm implementations. 
More on the compiler errors can be viewed in Appendix A. 
Definition of Terms 
Internet of Things (IoT)​ - There is no universally-accepted definition that exists for IoT. 
In the NIST special publication titled “Network of ‘Things’”, the author describes the underlying 
foundations for IoT without defining the IoT. He claims “That is useful since there is no singular 
IoT, and it is meaningless to speak of comparing one IoT to another” (Voas, 2016, p. 1). He 
describes Primitives as building blocks to describe the IoT, which will allow for comparisons 
between the different IoT’s.  
Primitives offer a unifying vocabulary that allows for composition and information 
exchange among differently purposed networks. They offer clarity regarding 
concerns that are subtle, including interoperability, composability, and 
continuously-binding assets that come and go on-the-fly…. This model does not 
specify a definition for what is or is not a ‘thing'. Instead, we consider that each 
primitive injects a behavior representing that ‘thing’ into a NoT’s(IoT) workflow 
and dataflow. ‘Things’ can occur in physical space or virtual space. (Voas, 2016, 
p. 1) 
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The primitives that are defined for the IoT are sensors, aggregators, communication channels, 
external utilities, and decision triggers. These make up the core components for the Internet of 
Things. 
Low power and Lossy Network (LLN)​ - A network of embedded devices that have 
limited power, memory, and processing capability.  
ARM​ - Advanced RISC Machine is a family of reduced instruction set computing (RISC) 
architectures for computer processors.  
RISC​ - Reduced Instruction Set Computer is a computer that has a small set of simple 
and general instructions. 
Post-Quantum Cryptography​ -  Cryptographic algorithms that are resistant to attacks 
from quantum computers. 
Public-key Encryption ​- Cryptographic system that utilizes a pair of keys, one public 
and one private. To ensure security, only the private key is required to be kept secret. The 
public key can be openly distributed without compromising security. 
SUPERCOP​ - System for Unified Performance Evaluation Related to Cryptographic 
Operations and Primitives. SUPERCOP is a toolkit developed for measuring the performance of 
cryptographic software. 
Summary 
Today’s IoT devices are very vulnerable to attack from hackers. While current public-key 
encryption will provide immediate protection, and should be standard on all network connected 
devices, it will not address future security needs that will arise with the advent of the quantum 
computer. The number of new IoT devices is going to be in the billions. They will need to be 
able to securely communicate over the internet using post-quantum encryption. Tomorrow’s 
encryption algorithms must be able to function on today’s IoT devices. The primary objective for 
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this study is to analyze the performance of post-quantum public-key encryption on IoT devices 
that are using ARM CPUs.   
14 
Chapter II: Background and Review of Literature 
Introduction 
This chapter will focus on the background information and literature reviewed in this 
study, as well as literature that is related to the methodology used. The articles published to 
date discuss the importance of having encryption on IoT devices, but are lacking in detailed 
information regarding the topic of this paper. Topics that this chapter covers include IoT 
guidelines, why devices should be made powerful enough to use encryption, introduction to the 
NIST algorithms, and literature related to the methodology used. 
Background and Literature Related to the problem 
According to Hewlett Packard’s 2015 report “Internet of Things research study,” 70 
percent of IoT devices did not encrypt communications to the Internet and local network, and 60 
percent did not use encryption when downloading software updates. These numbers were 
pulled from testing 10 devices that they believed to be a good indicator for the IoT market at that 
time. It's a good bet that IoT security has changed very little since then.  
By the year 2020, Cisco predicts there will be over 50 billion IoT devices connected to 
the internet, while Gartner, a global research and advisory firm, more modestly predicts the 
internet of things will be closer to 20 billion units. While there is no clear consensus on the exact 
number of IoT devices that will be in use by 2020 and beyond, the range for the predictions of 
total number devices is consistently in the tens of billions. That makes for a lot of vulnerable 
devices that are connected to the internet. 
As IoT data travels through multiple hops in a network, a proper encryption 
mechanism is required to ensure the confidentiality of data. Due to a diverse 
integration of services, devices and network, the data stored on a device is 
vulnerable to privacy violation by compromising nodes existing in an IoT network. 
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The IoT devices susceptible to attacks may cause an attacker to impact the data 
integrity by modifying the stored data for malicious purposes. (Khan & Salah, 
2018, p. 397) 
If you don’t use encryption in your IoT environment, then you may get hacked.  
In 2019, NIST came out with a list of guidelines called the “Core Cybersecurity Feature 
Baseline for Securable IoT Devices: A Starting Point for IoT Device Manufacturers”.  These 
guidelines were developed to help promote the best available practices for mitigating risks to 
IoT devices. Topics covered by the guidelines include the common risk mitigation area of Data 
Protection, which includes protecting data in transmission from unauthorized access and 
modification. These are just recommendations from NIST, and are not regulations that have to 
be followed.  
There are several potential barriers to using encryption on IoT devices. “Encryption can 
protect sensor data transmission integrity and confidentiality including cloud-to cloud 
communication, but it might render the IoT sensors unusable due to excessive energy 
requirements” (Voas, 2016, p. 22).  In order to make sure that a device is capable of using 
encryption, it needs to be designed with a powerful enough CPU and have enough energy to 
power it. 
Many sensor networks depend on the timely transmission of sensor data to 
aggregators or other controllers. Any delay of sensor data — especially in 
time-critical applications such as CO alarms — due to latency can have serious 
consequences or can render the sensor data useless. Security solutions (e.g., 
device authentication, encryption) applied to sensor networks may introduce 
latency. (Cichonski et al., 2019, p. 29) 
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Devices need to be designed with powerful enough CPUs because encryption is a 
processing-intensive operation. “Be forward-looking and size hardware resources for potential 
future use. As an example, if a device has a 10-year lifespan, it may be necessary to update the 
encryption algorithm or key length the device uses, and the new algorithm or key length may 
make encryption more processing-intensive” (Fagan et al.,2019, p. 14). 
As we look towards the post-quantum future, encryption processing needs will increase. 
With this increase, the devices that we have today may not be powerful enough to perform 
cryptography. That is why when we design an IoT device today, we need to keep the resources 
of the hardware in mind.  
Select or build a device with sufficient hardware resources (e.g., processing, 
memory, storage, network technology, power), as well as firmware and software 
resources, to support the desired features. For example, encryption is 
processing-intensive, and a device with limited processing might not be able to 
support encryption that customers need. Some devices cannot support the use of 
an operating system or Internet Protocol (IP) networks. (Fagan et al., 2019, p. 14) 
Making a device powerful enough to use encryption can be difficult when the device is 
battery-powered. When a device runs on a battery, the most important thing is keeping the 
power draw low, and in particular low standby power, as devices can be asleep for minutes or 
hours before waking up briefly. The power needed for the device to use encryption may be 
unattainable, or may unacceptably shorten the battery life.  
Currently NIST is on round 2 for the selection of the standards for post-quantum 
cryptography. Round 3 will begin sometime in 2020 or 2021. NIST considers the cost and 
performance of the algorithms to be the second most important characteristic for selecting the 
next standards. Memory requirements and computational efficiency are both considerations in 
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the cost of the algorithm. “NIST has completed preliminary efficiency analysis of the 
post-quantum public-key encryption algorithms on the reference platform, an Intel x64 running 
Windows or Linux and supporting the GNU Compiler Collection (GCC) compiler” (Alagic et al., 
2019, p. 5). NIST has only been considering the performance of these algorithms using an Intel 
x64 CPU and not any ARM processors. This is one area that is lacking an efficiency analysis for 
these algorithms.  
Out of the starting 82 candidate public-key encryption and digital signature algorithms, 
only 26 remain in the second round of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization 
Process. The 17 Second-Round Candidate public-key encryption and key-establishment 
algorithms include; BIKE, Classic McEliece, CRYSTALS-KYBER, FrodoKEM, HQC, LAC, 
LEDAcrypt, NewHope, NTRU, NTRU Prime, NTS-KEM, ROLLO, Round5, RQC, SABER, SIKE, 
and Three Bears. The 9 digital signature candidate algorithms in the second round include; 
CRYSTALS-DILITHIUM, FALCON, GeMSS, LUOV, MQDSS, Picnic, qTESLA, Rainbow, and 
SPHINCS+. 
Literature Related to the Methodology 
To compare other partially related methodologies, the research paper on “A 
Comprehensive Evaluation of Cryptographic Algorithms: DES, 3DES, AES, RSA and Blowfish,” 
was examined. In it, the authors go over the different evaluation parameters that they used in 
their experiment. In this project, the parameters that will undergo analysis include encryption, 
decryption time, and memory used. Encryption time is the time it takes for the encryption 
algorithm to convert plaintext into ciphertext. Decryption time is the opposite, the ciphertext is 
converted back into plaintext. The encryption and decryption time will be measured in 
milliseconds. This time will affect the performance of the system. The different algorithms will 
use different key sizes, number of operations done by the algorithm, initialization vectors used 
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and type of operations. This leads to requiring different memory sizes for implementation of the 
different algorithms (Patil et al., 2016). 
Summary 
This chapter reviewed IoT guidelines, discussing the common risk mitigation area of 
Data Protection. It also examined the roadblocks to using encryption on IoT devices, with lack of 
enough power being the biggest obstacle. The 17 NIST post-quantum public-key encryption 
algorithms were introduced, and although somewhat limited, the available literature related to 
the methodology was reviewed.  
Although the articles published to date do show a robust discussion about the 
importance of having encryption on IoT devices, there is a lack of detailed information regarding 
the topic of this paper, which is focused on analyzing the performance of post-quantum 
public-key encryption algorithms on IoT devices that are using ARM CPUs. 
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Chapter III: Methodology 
Introduction 
This chapter will provide an explanation of the methodology used and the procedures 
applied in order to achieve the objectives of this research. The first section covers aspects of 
how the study was designed, including a discussion of the data collected and the hardware 
used. The next section focuses on the algorithm implementations that were used in this study, 
and it includes an explanation of the selection criteria used to choose the algorithms tested. The 
last section of this chapter focuses on the benchmarking toolkit SUPERCOP, and its use in this 
research.  
Design of the Study 
This study used a quantitative approach to determine how well each of the post-quantum 
public-key encryption and key-establishment algorithms, found in the second round of NIST 
standardization, performed on chosen hardware. Due to the large number of different 
implementations that each of the algorithms have, this paper only focused on the performance 
of one of the implementations per post-quantum algorithm. If none of the implementations for 
one of the algorithms were able to compile on the chosen device and operating system, then 
that algorithm was not included in the study. The operating system and processor architecture 
were chosen to maximize the number of working implementations for analysis. 
The implementation chosen for each of the post-quantum schemes were the optimized 
versions if they were available. If an optimized version was not available, then the reference 
implementation was used instead. If there were multiple versions with different key lengths, then 
the implementation with the shortest key was chosen. The implementations of the post-quantum 
schemes were integrated into the benchmarking toolkit SUPERCOP. 
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Data Collection 
Data collection was conducted using the benchmarking toolkit SUPERCOP version 
20191221. This toolkit includes key-encapsulation mechanisms for all 17 of the post-quantum 
public-key encryption and key-establishment algorithms. It also includes several of the 
public-key cryptosystems. All of the Key-Establishment Mechanisms (KEM) data was collected 
using the SUPERCOP toolkit ECRYPT Benchmarking of Asymmetric Systems (eBATS). 
Performance measurements for KEM that SUPERCOP collects are listed on the bench.cr.yp.to 
website. (Bernstein, n.d.) 
● Time in cycles to generate a key pair - the secret key and the corresponding public key. 
● Time for encapsulation - time to compute a ciphertext and corresponding session key. 
● Time for decapsulation - the time to compute the session key from the ciphertext. 
● Space in bytes for a public key. 
● Space in bytes for a ciphertext. 
● Space in bytes for a session key. 
Performance measurements for the public-key cryptosystems that SUPERCOP collects are 
listed on the bench.cr.yp.to website. (Bernstein, n.d.) 
● Time in cycles to generate a key pair - the secret key and the corresponding public key. 
● Time to encrypt a short 59 byte message. 
● Time to decrypt a short 59 byte message 
● Space in bytes for a secret key. 
● Space in bytes for a public key. 
● Ciphertext length for a 0-byte message. 
● Ciphertext overhead for a 23-byte message. 
● Ciphertext overhead for a long message. 
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Hardware and Operating System Environment 
This study used both the Raspberry Pi 3 B+ and Raspberry Pi 4 to conduct the 
performance tests. The operating system used was the current version of Ubuntu 19.10. This 
allowed both the Raspberry Pi 3B+ and Raspberry Pi 4 to run the ARMv8 instruction set 
architecture. The ARMv8 architecture introduced the 64 bit execution state AArch64, making it 
compatible with the benchmarking toolkit SUPERCOP (Arm Ltd, n.d.). 
The first ARMv8 device to be tested was the Raspberry Pi 3B+. It has the Broadcom 
BCM2837B0 quad-core A53 processor running at 1.4 GHz as well as 1 GB of RAM.  The 
Raspberry Pi 3B+ is shown below in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1​. Raspberry Pi 3 B+ 
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The other system on a chip (SoC) that was tested was the Raspberry Pi 4. It has a 
Broadcom BCM2711, Quad coreCortex-A72 processor running at 1.5GHz. It also has twice as 
much memory as the Raspberry Pi 3B+ at 2 GB of RAM. The Raspberry Pi 4 is shown in Figure 
2 below. 
 
Figure 2. ​Raspberry Pi 4 
Summary 
This chapter discussed how this study was designed, which data measurements were 
germane to collect, and important details about the hardware used. For the scope of this study, 
it is important to define why each of the implementations were chosen. The benchmarking 
toolkit SUPERCOP was very useful for testing out many different measurements related to 
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cryptographic performance. The toolkit came prepackaged with all of the latest post-quantum 
cryptographic algorithms needed for this study. Although the Raspberry Pi 3B+ and the 
Raspberry Pi 4 look practically identical on the outside, under the hood, the Raspberry Pi 4 
possesses superior processing speed and RAM. The tests listed in this chapter put the 
hardware to the test to see if the algorithms would perform significantly different depending on 
which device was being used.  
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Chapter IV: Data Presentation and Analysis 
Introduction 
This chapter presents and analyzes the data collected by the methods mentioned in the 
previous chapter.  First, the data that was collected will be presented in a series of tables and 
graphs.  Next, the performance of each of the different key-encapsulation methods will be 
analyzed for both the Raspberry Pi 3B+ and Raspberry Pi 4. The last section of this chapter will 
focus on analyzing the performance of the public-key cryptosystems. 
Data Presentation - Key-Encapsulation Mechanisms 
The following tables include data collected from 14 of the 17 post-quantum 
key-encapsulation mechanisms using version 20191221 of SUPERCOP. There were 3 
algorithms that had failed to compile while running the tests. More information on those 3 
algorithms and why they failed can be viewed in Appendix A. For information on the compile 
time, primitive, implementation and the compiler used for the algorithm implementations that 
were able to successfully compile, see Appendix B. The tables for space size, in bytes, that 
each algorithm used for a secret key, public key, ciphertext, and session key, can be viewed in 
Appendix C. Each of the algorithm implementations in the tables are either the optimized 
versions, the version with the smallest key length, or the version that was able to compile. The 
following tables show the first quartile, median, and third quartile cycles it took to either generate 
a key pair, encapsulation, or decapsulation of keys for both of the devices tested. The values 
are the average of many speed measurements ("eBACS: ECRYPT Benchmarking of 
Cryptographic Systems", n.d.). 
Table 1 and Table 2 show the cycles to generate a key pair for the Raspberry Pi 3B+ 
and Raspberry Pi 4 respectively. For both devices, the fastest key-encapsulation mechanism to 
generate key pairs was lightsaber and the slowest key-encapsulation mechanism to generate 
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key pairs was mceliece348864f. There was a massive difference between the fastest and 
slowest key-encapsulation mechanism tested. The fastest key-encapsulation mechanism, 
lightsaber, was over 4500 times faster than the slowest mceliece348864f for key generation. For 
both the RAspberry Pi 3B+ and the Raspberry Pi 4 there were stability issues with many of the 
Classic McEliece algorithm implementations generating keys. The key-encapsulation 
mechanism mceliece348864f was one of the only Classic McEliece algorithm implementations 
that did not have stability issues. The algorithm implementations that did have stability issues 
tended to produce a large variance between the first, median, and third quartile.  
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Table 1 
Cycles to generate a key pair for KEM on Raspberry Pi 3b+ 
quartile median quartile system 
161220 161702 162019 lightsaber 
194547 196753 205281 r5nd0kem2iot 
266971 265331 268275 kyber512 
283474 282306 286272 newhope512cca 
331105 331725 332057 threebears624r2cpax 
1505188 1517069 1536146 hqc1281 
3944721 3995211 4012819 ntrukem443 
21096658 21111815 21172881 sntrup653 
21968557 21975555 21985111 frodokem640 
53282599 101947929 151081615 bike2l1nc 
112207782 112577462 112777600 ledakem13 
148714473 161685593 190310821 ntskem1264 
170332098 170273427 171121725 sikep503 
735216332 741023508 745088028 mceliece348864f 
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Table 2 
Cycles to generate a key pair for KEM on Raspberry Pi 4 
quartile median quartile system 
100288 99373 99529 lightsaber 
107115 108324 112041 r5nd0kem2iot 
134446 133962 134134 kyber512 
134772 134505 135136 newhope512cca 
208662 209888 210125 threebears624r2cpax 
1036922 1068988 1079539 ntrukem443 
1175044 1183380 1206649 hqc1281 
12367120 12385844 12442216 sntrup653 
15911486 15944148 15981147 frodokem640 
25234359 47522680 69974155 bike2l1nc 
69931488 70185868 70424832 ledakem13 
94252120 141133288 312818998 ntskem1264 
144212647 144185373 144533570 sikep503 
437367115 449889390 454446677 mceliece348864f 
 
The next two tables show the number of cycles it took for encapsulation. This is the time 
it takes to compute a ciphertext and corresponding session key, given a user's public key. The 
fastest and slowest key-encapsulation mechanisms for key generation were the two fastest 
encapsulation schemes for both Raspberry Pi 3B+ and Raspberry Pi 4.  
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Table 3 
Cycles for encapsulation on Raspberry Pi 3B+ 
quartile median quartile system 
228944 227909 228451 lightsaber 
283309 295304 463256 mceliece348864f 
288099 289925 298868 r5nd0kem2iot 
330755 331240 332722 ledakem13 
377220 378673 381677 kyber512 
414093 414212 418681 threebears624r2cpax 
440119 441561 453019 newhope512cca 
450100 459282 478675 ntrukem443 
508543 544320 607653 ntskem1264 
727667 729533 735709 sntrup653 
2211011 2229902 2249088 bike2l1nc 
3024409 3046613 3069753 hqc1281 
24180080 24185866 24209172 frodokem640 
280446444 280476545 281379281 sikep503 
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Table 4 
Cycles for encapsulation on Raspberry Pi 4 
quartile median quartile system 
142244 149368 154765 mceliece348864f 
143773 143444 143490 lightsaber 
160110 161077 166302 r5nd0kem2iot 
179223 180000 180322 kyber512 
210296 208937 209215 ledakem13 
210882 210550 211079 newhope512cca 
214501 217742 249918 ntrukem443 
258894 261057 261494 threebears624r2cpax 
424221 459114 523020 ntskem1264 
482848 487049 488390 sntrup653 
1343338 1359618 1442061 bike2l1nc 
2342002 2368109 2415056 hqc1281 
18255132 18356963 18388720 frodokem640 
237423418 237557045 238075832 sikep503 
 
The next two tables show the number of cycles it took for decapsulation. This is the time 
it takes to compute the session key from the ciphertext, given the user's secret key. Once again 
the slowest algorithm implementation was sikep503 for both the Raspberry Pi 3B+ and the 
Raspberry Pi 4. Lightsaber was beaten by both threebears624r2cpax and r5nd0kem2iot for the 
fastest implementation for decapsulation.  
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Table 5 
Cycles for decapsulation on Raspberry Pi 3B+ 
quartile median quartile system 
61266 61233 61334 threebears624r2cpax 
146201 156040 156925 r5nd0kem2iot 
276788 277128 277370 lightsaber 
491568 488199 490089 kyber512 
538448 540960 557435 newhope512cca 
738774 741586 753260 ntrukem443 
1227650 1239358 1335353 mceliece348864f 
1343348 1357655 1383831 ntskem1264 
1666956 1666587 1671357 sntrup653 
2131109 2134735 2161925 ledakem13 
5162268 5172510 5237488 hqc1281 
24401849 24436275 24498193 frodokem640 
64049890 64152064 76001578 bike2l1nc 
298374048 298407255 299534009 sikep503 
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Table 6 
Cycles for decapsulation on Raspberry Pi 4 
quartile median quartile system 
38522 38339 38391 threebears624r2cpax 
82311 83016 84223 r5nd0kem2iot 
167236 167685 168379 lightsaber 
218907 219436 219466 kyber512 
243330 243308 244938 newhope512cca 
291892 292805 298973 ntrukem443 
669115 676821 679115 mceliece348864f 
863900 899553 927884 ntskem1264 
1083039 1083628 1087204 sntrup653 
1383899 1390815 1414088 ledakem13 
3613350 3744759 3796920 hqc1281 
18208288 18235332 18249562 frodokem640 
26192249 26254360 27222465 bike2l1nc 
252600237 253272348 253456422 sikep503 
 
Data Presentation - Public-Key Cryptosystems 
The following tables include data collected from the three cryptosystems that were 
available in version 20191221 of SUPERCOP. These are the cryptosystems that were 
submitted to the second round of the NIST competition for public-key encryption. SUPERCOP 
included other cryptosystems of algorithms other than the ones submitted to the NIST 
competition. However, they were not relevant to this paper and therefore were not included in 
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the tables below. The tables for the secret key, public key, encrypting 0 bytes, encrypting 23 
bytes, and encrypting many bytes are included in Appendix D. Each of the algorithm 
implementations in the tables are the optimized versions. The following tables show the first 
quartile, median, and third quartile cycles it took to either generate a key pair, encrypt 59 bytes, 
or decrypt 59 bytes for both of the devices tested. The three public-key cryptosystem algorithms 
tested in this paper are NTRU Prime, LEDAcrypt, and Round 5. 
Table 7 and 8 below show the cycles to generate a key pair for the Raspberry Pi 3B+ 
and Raspberry Pi 4 respectively. There was a huge discrepancy between the fastest and 
slowest algorithm. The algorithm implementation r5nd1pke5d was over six thousand times 
faster than ledapkc10 for both devices. For each of the algorithms, the Raspberry Pi 4 
outperformed the Raspberry Pi 3B+. 
Table 7 
Cycles to generate a key pair for public-key encryption on Raspberry Pi 3B+ 
quartile median quartile system 
173636 174079 175740 r5nd1pke5d 
1712548 1722841 1799144 ntruees401ep2 
1068451694 1070934568 1072781948 ledapkc10 
 
Table 8 
Cycles to generate a key pair for public-key encryption on Raspberry Pi 4 
quartile median quartile system 
97220 99188 99784 r5nd1pke5d 
621187 637728 641796 ntruees401ep2 
655194875 683602187 685294895 ledapkc10 
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The tables 9 and 10 below show the number of cycles it took to encrypt 59 bytes of data 
on the Raspberry Pi 3B+ and Raspberry Pi4 respectively. The implementation ntruees401ep2 
had a faster time for encryption than r5nd1pke5d, even though the latter was much faster for 
key generation. 
Table 9 
Cycles to encrypt 59 bytes on Raspberry Pi 3B+ 
quartile median quartile system 
102309 103019 109573 ntruees401ep2 
290008 290793 292096 r5nd1pke5d 
20689497 20700112 20710384 ledapkc10 
 
Table 10 
Cycles to encrypt 59 bytes on Raspberry Pi 4 
quartile median quartile system 
61229 62513 62837 ntruees401ep2 
163139 166090 166737 r5nd1pke5d 
13714784 13644864 13658967 ledapkc10 
 
Table 11 and Table 12 show the number of cycles for decrypting a 59 byte message. 
Once again, ledapkc10 was the slowest algorithm out of the three by far on both the Raspberry 
Pi 3B+ and Raspberry Pi 4.  
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Table 11  
Cycles to decrypt 59 bytes on Raspberry Pi 3B+ 
quartile median quartile system 
149209 150341 158108 ntruees401ep2 
420210 421204 422267 r5nd1pke5d 
5694057 5698432 5702822 ledapkc10 
 
Table 12 
Cycles to decrypt 59 bytes on Raspberry Pi 4 
quartile median quartile system 
75879 75248 76495 ntruees401ep2 
230025 230488 231765 r5nd1pke5d 
3218949 3267138 4427467 ledapkc10 
 
Data Analysis 
The data collected by SUPERCOP was first examined by creating several graphs that 
show how closely the grouping was for the algorithms on both of the devices. Then calculations 
were done for a two-tailed paired t-test. The null hypothesis for each of the different 
key-encapsulation mechanisms were tested using this t-test.  
The performance of the KEM key generation time comparing the Raspberry Pi 3B+ and 
the Raspberry Pi 4 can be seen in Figure 3 below. The graph is on a log scale for both the x and 
y axis. The x axis shows the time in CPU cycles and the y axis shows the public key size in 
bytes. The data points to the farthest left are the algorithms that were the fastest. The data 
points are on the same level vertically, because the algorithms generate a public key that is the 
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same length on both of the devices.
 
Figure​ ​3​.​ KEM Key Generation Time. Key-encapsulation mechanism cycles to generate key 
pairs vs. size of public key. 
The next graph shows how the data for KEM encapsulation time is grouped for both the 
Raspberry Pi 3B+ and the Raspberry Pi 4. This graph has a log scale on both the x and y axis. 
The x axis shows the time in CPU cycles and the y axis shows the ciphertext length in bytes. 
The data points are on the same level vertically, because the algorithms generate a public key 
that is the same length on both of the devices.  
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Figure 4.​ KEM Encapsulation Time. Key-encapsulation mechanism cycles to encapsulate keys 
vs size of the ciphertext in bytes. 
The next graph shows how the data for KEM decapsulation time is grouped for both the 
Raspberry Pi 3B+ and the Raspberry Pi 4. This graph has a log scale on both the x and y axis. 
The x axis shows the time in CPU cycles and the y axis shows the ciphertext length in bytes. 
The data points are on the same level vertically, because the algorithms generate a public key 
that is the same length on both of the devices. 
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Figure 5.​ KEM Decapsulation Time. Key-encapsulation mechanism cycles to decapsulate keys 
vs size of the ciphertext in bytes.  
While the graphs above give a good visualization of several different performance 
metrics, including the time to generate a key pair, the time for encapsulation, and the time for 
decapsulation, the two-tailed paired t-test was used to determine if the null hypothesis should be 
rejected. The probabilities were created by comparing the difference in the mean time for each 
of the algorithms on both the Raspberry Pi 3B+ and the Raspberry Pi 4. These probabilities 
were compared against a significance level of ⍺ = 0.05. This process was repeated for all of the 
different performance metrics collected. Due to the limited scope of this paper, described in the 
methodology chapter of this paper, the statistical analysis has a limited sample size that only 
includes the best algorithm implementations.  
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Summary 
This chapter presented the data collected using the SUPERCOP toolkit. During testing, 
only 14 of the 17 KEM algorithms were able to compile to run the tests. The graphs give a good 
visualization of how all of the performance metrics for each of the algorithms compare on the 
Raspberry Pi 3B+ and Raspberry Pi 4. The three cryptosystem algorithms tested showed that 
one of the algorithms was way slower than the other two. Finally, this chapter also discussed 
how the two-tailed paired t-test was used to determine if the null hypothesis should be rejected.  
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Chapter V: Results, Conclusions, and Future Work 
Introduction 
This chapter will review the results of the data that was analyzed in the previous chapter. 
First, the null hypothesis will be broken down into its different measurable performance metrics. 
Next, the conclusions of this study will be presented. Finally, future work related to this study will 
be discussed. 
Results 
The null hypothesis of this study proposes that there is no difference between the two 
ARMv8 devices regarding the benchmarked performance of public-key encryption and 
key-establishment algorithms using SUPERCOP. The null hypothesis was tested by doing a 
statistical analysis for each of the measurable performance metrics to see if the two devices 
performed significantly different. This study explores several different performance metrics, 
including the time to generate a key pair, the time for encapsulation, and the time for 
decapsulation. 
The first null hypothesis proposes that there will be no difference between the two 
ARMv8 devices regarding the performance of the time to generate a key pair for the KEMs. The 
time to generate a key pair for the key-encapsulation mechanisms is the number of cycles it 
takes to generate a secret key and a corresponding public key. The results from the Raspberry 
Pi 3B+ (​M​ = 95524670, ​SD​ = 196217289) and the Raspberry Pi 4 (​M​ = 63156072, ​SD​ = 
122431006) indicate that there was no significant difference between the two devices, ​t​(13) = 
1.58, ​p​ = .137. With the probability being higher than the ⍺ = 0.05 in the two-tailed paired t-test, 
the null hypothesis is accepted and the alternative hypothesis is rejected.  
The second null hypothesis proposes that  there will be no difference between the two 
ARMv8 devices regarding the performance of the time for encapsulation. The time for 
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encapsulation  is the number of cycles it takes to compute a ciphertext and corresponding 
session key, given a user's public key. The results from the Raspberry Pi 3B+ (​M​ = 22432206, 
SD​ = 74536171) and the Raspberry Pi 4 (​M​ = 18722862, ​SD​ = 63166994) indicate that there 
was no significant difference between the two devices, ​t​(13) = 1.22, ​p​ = .244. With the 
probability being higher than the ⍺ = 0.05 in the two-tailed paired t-test, the null hypothesis is 
accepted and the alternative hypothesis is rejected. 
The third null hypothesis proposes that  there will be no difference between the two 
ARMv8 devices regarding the performance of the time for decapsulation. The time for 
decapsulation  is the number of cycles it takes to compute the session key from the ciphertext, 
given the user's secret key. The results from the Raspberry Pi 3B+ (​M​ = 28630827, ​SD​ = 
79576776) and the Raspberry Pi 4 (​M​ = 21900157, ​SD​ = 67066381) indicate that there was no 
significant difference between the two devices, ​t​(13) = 1.69, ​p​ = .115. With the probability being 
higher than the ⍺ = 0.05 in the two-tailed paired t-test, the null hypothesis is accepted and the 
alternative hypothesis is rejected. 
Conclusion 
The results of this study show that the speed for the public-key encryption and 
key-establishment algorithms tested on the Raspberry Pi 3B+ and Raspberry Pi 4 were not 
significantly different. Taking a look at the number and selection of the samples may help 
explain how this result was not totally unexpected. This study was narrowly focused on testing 
only the fastest implementation (optimized or had the shortest key length) for each of the tested 
post-quantum algorithms. With only 14 post-quantum algorithms tested, this selection process 
generated a small sample size. Having such a small sample size can affect the quality of the 
results for the statistical analysis. 
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This study does not take into account the different security levels for each of the algorithm 
implementations. If the focus of the algorithm was to be as robust as possible to attacks, such 
as perfect forward secrecy, resistance to side-channel and multi-key attacks, as well as 
resistance to misuse, then that algorithm would need to sacrifice speed for increased security. 
Depending on the security needs, it may be more beneficial to use the slower algorithm 
implementation for encryption. The implementations that are more optimized were able to 
perform better on all hardware without causing a significant bottleneck, while poorly optimized 
implementations may lead to bottlenecks and exacerbated differences in algorithm speed.  
Future Work 
When NIST moves onto round 3 of the post-quantum cryptography public-key encryption 
and key-establishment algorithms standardization, even more performance testing should be 
done. For example, this study does not include memory testing. Future studies should include 
testing on how much memory is used for generating keys, encapsulation, decapsulation, etc.  
Other hardware to consider for future testing are ARM Cortex-M series processors. 
These processors are optimized for cost and power-efficient microcontrollers. They use less 
energy and are less powerful than the ARM Cortex-A. Neither of the Raspberry Pi 3B+ nor 
Raspberry Pi 4 are considered to be constrained devices. The ARM Cortex-M series processors 
are used on constrained devices where memory, CPU processing power, and CPU power draw 
can be a problem.  
The SUPERCOP version 20191221 had problems compiling on the ARMv6 Raspberry 
Pi Zero W. The Raspberry Pi Zero W only runs AArch32, and had problems trying to compile the 
different post-quantum algorithms. Of the 17 post-quantum algorithms, there were three 
algorithms ( ROLLO, LAC, and RQC) that had problems compiling on the Raspberry Pi devices 
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used in this study. Future testing of the post-quantum algorithms should take this into account 
and make sure that there are implementations available that are able to compile correctly.  
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Appendix A 
The three post-quantum key-encapsulation mechanisms that failed to compile include 
ROLLO, LAC, and RQC. When the algorithms failed to compile, SUPERCOP produced an error 
output. The error output is listed here in Appendix A. 
ROLLO is a compilation of the three post-quantum schemes Rank-Ouroboros, LOCKER, 
and LAKE. Both LAKE and LOCKER are included in SUPERCOP version 20191221. For 
ROLLO, neither LAKE nor LOCKER would compile correctly. Due to the compiler errors it is not 
included in the main analysis of this study. The Compiler output is pasted below.  
Compiler output for locker1: 
Implementation: crypto_kem/locker1/ref 
Compiler: g++ -march=native -mtune=native -O2 -fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv -fPIC -fPIE 
try.cpp:​ /usr/bin/ld: 
/home/djb/benchmarking/supercop-20191221/supercop-data/pi3bplus/aarch64/lib/libntl.a(GF2E.
o): undefined reference to symbol 'pthread_setspecific@@GLIBC_2.17' 
try.cpp:​ /usr/bin/ld: //lib/aarch64-linux-gnu/libpthread.so.0: error adding symbols: DSO missing 
from command line 
try.cpp:​ collect2: error: ld returned 1 exit status 
Compiler output for lake1: 
Implementation: crypto_kem/lake1/ref 
Compiler: g++ -march=native -mtune=native -O2 -fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv -fPIC -fPIE 
try.cpp: /usr/bin/ld: 
/home/djb/benchmarking/supercop-20191221/supercop-data/pi3bplus/aarch64/lib/libntl.a(GF2E.
o): undefined reference to symbol 'pthread_setspecific@@GLIBC_2.17' 
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try.cpp: /usr/bin/ld: //lib/aarch64-linux-gnu/libpthread.so.0: error adding symbols: DSO missing 
from command line 
try.cpp: collect2: error: ld returned 1 exit status 
The LAC implementation lac128 had both a checksum failure and test failure outputs 
after trying to compile. It is not included in the main analysis of this study. The compiler output is 
pasted below. 
Checksum failure for lac128: 
Implementation: crypto_kem/lac128/opt 
Compiler: gcc -march=native -mtune=native -O2 -fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv -fPIC -fPIE 
Test failure for lac128: 
Implementation: crypto_kem/lac128/opt 
Compiler: clang -mcpu=native -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv -Qunused-arguments -fPIC 
-fPIE 
error 111 
crypto_kem_dec does not match k 
Compiler output for lac128: 
Implementation: crypto_kem/lac128/avx2 
Compiler: clang -mcpu=native -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv -Qunused-arguments -fPIC 
-fPIE 
bin-lwe.c: In file included from bin-lwe.c:1: 
bin-lwe.c: In file included from /usr/lib/llvm-9/lib/clang/9.0.0/include/immintrin.h:14: 
bin-lwe.c: /usr/lib/llvm-9/lib/clang/9.0.0/include/mmintrin.h:50:12: error: invalid conversion 
between vector type '__m64' (vector of 1 'long long' value) and integer type 'int' of different size 
bin-lwe.c: return (__m64)__builtin_ia32_vec_init_v2si(__i, 0); 
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bin-lwe.c: ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
bin-lwe.c: /usr/lib/llvm-9/lib/clang/9.0.0/include/mmintrin.h:129:12: error: invalid conversion 
between vector type '__m64' (vector of 1 'long long' value) and integer type 'int' of different size 
bin-lwe.c: return (__m64)__builtin_ia32_packsswb((__v4hi)__m1, (__v4hi)__m2); 
bin-lwe.c: ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
bin-lwe.c: /usr/lib/llvm-9/lib/clang/9.0.0/include/mmintrin.h:159:12: error: invalid conversion 
between vector type '__m64' (vector of 1 'long long' value) and integer type 'int' of different size 
bin-lwe.c: return (__m64)__builtin_ia32_packssdw((__v2si)__m1, (__v2si)__m2); 
bin-lwe.c: ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
bin-lwe.c: /usr/lib/llvm-9/lib/clang/9.0.0/include/mmintrin.h:189:12: error: invalid conversion 
between vector type '__m64' (vector of 1 'long long' value) and integer type 'int' of different size 
bin-lwe.c: return (__m64)__builtin_ia32_packuswb((__v4hi)__m1, (__v4hi)__m2); 
bin-lwe.c: ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
bin-lwe.c: /usr/lib/llvm-9/lib/clang/9.0.0/include/mmintrin.h:216:12: error: invalid conversion 
between vector type '__m64' (vector of 1 'long long' value) and integer type 'int' of different size 
bin-lwe.c: return (__m64)__builtin_ia32_punpckhbw((__v8qi)__m1, (__v8qi)__m2); 
bin-lwe.c: ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
bin-lwe.c: /usr/lib/llvm-9/lib/clang/9.0.0/include/mmintrin.h:239:12: error: invalid conversion 
between vector type '__m64' (vector of 1 'long long' value) and integer type 'int' of different size 
bin-lwe.c: return (__m64)__builtin_ia32_punpckhwd((__v4hi)__m1, (__v4hi)__m2); 
bin-lwe.c: ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
bin-lwe.c: /usr/lib/llvm-9/lib/clang/9.0.0/include/mmintrin.h:260:12: error: invalid conversion 
between vector type '__m64' (vector of 1 'long long' value) and integer type 'int' of different size 
bin-lwe.c: return (__m64)__builtin_ia32_punpckhdq((__v2si)__m1, (__v2si)__m2); 
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bin-lwe.c: ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
bin-lwe.c: /usr/lib/llvm-9/lib/clang/9.0.0/include/mmintrin.h:287:12: error: invalid conversion 
between vector type '__m64' (vector of 1 'long long' value) and integer type 'int' of different size 
bin-lwe.c: return (__m64)__builtin_ia32_punpcklbw((__v8qi)__m1, (__v8qi)__m2); 
bin-lwe.c: ... 
Implementation: crypto_kem/lac128/opt 
Compiler: clang -mcpu=native -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv -Qunused-arguments -fPIC 
-fPIE 
bin-lwe.c: bin-lwe.c:98:10: warning: result of comparison of constant -1 with expression of type 
'const char' is always false [-Wtautological-constant-out-of-range-compare] 
bin-lwe.c: if(s[i]==-1) 
bin-lwe.c: ~~~~^ ~~ 
bin-lwe.c: bin-lwe.c:160:10: warning: result of comparison of constant -1 with expression of type 
'const char' is always false [-Wtautological-constant-out-of-range-compare] 
bin-lwe.c: if(s[i]==-1) 
bin-lwe.c: ~~~~^ ~~ 
bin-lwe.c: 2 warnings generated. 
Implementation: crypto_kem/lac128/avx2 
Compiler: gcc -march=native -mtune=native -O2 -fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv -fPIC -fPIE 
bin-lwe.c: bin-lwe.c:1:10: fatal error: immintrin.h: No such file or directory 
bin-lwe.c: 1 | #include <immintrin.h> 
bin-lwe.c: | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
bin-lwe.c: compilation terminated. 
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The RQC implementation rqc128/opt had a compiler error that ends with compilation 
terminated and is not included in the main analysis of this study. The compiler output is pasted 
below. 
Compiler output for rqc128/opt: 
Implementation: crypto_kem/rqc128/opt 
Compiler: clang -mcpu=native -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv -Qunused-arguments -fPIC 
-fPIE 
ffi_elt.c: In file included from ffi_elt.c:6: 
ffi_elt.c: In file included from ./ffi.h:11: 
ffi_elt.c: In file included from /usr/lib/llvm-7/lib/clang/7.0.1/include/x86intrin.h:29: 
ffi_elt.c: In file included from /usr/lib/llvm-7/lib/clang/7.0.1/include/immintrin.h:28: 
ffi_elt.c: /usr/lib/llvm-7/lib/clang/7.0.1/include/mmintrin.h:64:12: error: invalid conversion between 
vector type '__m64' (vector of 1 'long long' value) and integer type 'int' of different size 
ffi_elt.c: return (__m64)__builtin_ia32_vec_init_v2si(__i, 0); 
ffi_elt.c: ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
ffi_elt.c: /usr/lib/llvm-7/lib/clang/7.0.1/include/mmintrin.h:143:12: error: invalid conversion 
between vector type '__m64' (vector of 1 'long long' value) and integer type 'int' of different size 
ffi_elt.c: return (__m64)__builtin_ia32_packsswb((__v4hi)__m1, (__v4hi)__m2); 
ffi_elt.c: ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
ffi_elt.c: /usr/lib/llvm-7/lib/clang/7.0.1/include/mmintrin.h:173:12: error: invalid conversion 
between vector type '__m64' (vector of 1 'long long' value) and integer type 'int' of different size 
ffi_elt.c: return (__m64)__builtin_ia32_packssdw((__v2si)__m1, (__v2si)__m2); 
ffi_elt.c: ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
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ffi_elt.c: /usr/lib/llvm-7/lib/clang/7.0.1/include/mmintrin.h:203:12: error: invalid conversion 
between vector type '__m64' (vector of 1 'long long' value) and integer type 'int' of different size 
ffi_elt.c: return (__m64)__builtin_ia32_packuswb((__v4hi)__m1, (__v4hi)__m2); 
ffi_elt.c: ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
ffi_elt.c: /usr/lib/llvm-7/lib/clang/7.0.1/include/mmintrin.h:230:12: error: invalid conversion 
between vector type '__m64' (vector of 1 'long long' value) and integer type 'int' of different size 
ffi_elt.c: return (__m64)__builtin_ia32_punpckhbw((__v8qi)__m1, (__v8qi)__m2); 
ffi_elt.c: ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
ffi_elt.c: /usr/lib/llvm-7/lib/clang/7.0.1/include/mmintrin.h:253:12: error: invalid conversion 
between vector type '__m64' (vector of 1 'long long' value) and integer type 'int' of different size 
ffi_elt.c: return (__m64)__builtin_ia32_punpckhwd((__v4hi)__m1, (__v4hi)__m2); 
ffi_elt.c: ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
ffi_elt.c: /usr/lib/llvm-7/lib/clang/7.0.1/include/mmintrin.h:274:12: error: invalid conversion 
between vector type '__m64' (vector of 1 'long long' value) and integer type 'int' of different size 
ffi_elt.c: return (__m64)__builtin_ia32_punpckhdq((__v2si)__m1, (__v2si)__m2); 
ffi_elt.c: ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
ffi_elt.c: ... 
Implementation: crypto_kem/rqc128/opt 
Compiler: gcc -march=native -mtune=native -O2 -fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv -fPIC -fPIE 
ffi_elt.c: In file included from ffi_elt.c:6: 
ffi_elt.c: ffi.h:11:10: fatal error: x86intrin.h: No such file or directory 
ffi_elt.c: #include <x86intrin.h> 
ffi_elt.c: ^~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
ffi_elt.c: compilation terminated.  
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Appendix B 
The following tables include SUPERCOP output for crypto_kem that includes the time in 
processor cycles,  primitive, implementation of the algorithm, and compiler used for both the 
Raspberry Pi 3B+ and the Raspberry Pi 4. 
Table 13 
aarch64, pi3bplusubuntuserver64, crypto_kem compiler output 
Time Relative 
time 
Primitive Implementation Compiler 
28681863 1.00 bike2l1nc crypto_kem/bike2l
1nc/ref_ossl 
(BIKE_v1.0_Additi
onal_11/18/2018) 
gcc -march=native 
-mtune=native -O3 
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv 
-fPIC -fPIE (9.2.1 20191008) 
840038 1.00 mceliece348864
f 
crypto_kem/mceli
ece348864f/vec 
clang -mcpu=native -O3 
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv 
-Qunused-arguments -fPIC 
-fPIE (Clang 9.0.0 
(tags/RELEASE 900/final)) 
399185 1.00 kyber512 crypto_kem/kyber
512/ref 
clang -mcpu=native -O3 
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv 
-Qunused-arguments -fPIC 
-fPIE (Clang 9.0.0 
(tags/RELEASE 900/final)) 
64181560 1.00 frodokem640 crypto_kem/frodok
em640/optimized 
clang -mcpu=native -O3 
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv 
-Qunused-arguments -fPIC 
-fPIE (Clang 9.0.0 
(tags/RELEASE 900/final)) 
6044516 1.00 hqc1281 crypto_kem/hqc12
81/opt 
gcc -march=native 
-mtune=native -O3 
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv 
-fPIC -fPIE (9.2.1 20191008) 
1592907 1.00 ledakem13 crypto_kem/ledak
em13/portableopt 
gcc -march=native 
-mtune=native -O3 
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv 
-fPIC -fPIE (9.2.1 20191008) 
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Table 13 continued 
Time Relative 
time 
Primitive Implementation Compiler 
454115 1.00 newhope512cca crypto_kem/new
hope512cca/ref 
gcc -march=native 
-mtune=native -O3 
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv 
-fPIC -fPIE (9.2.1 20191008) 
536038 1.00 ntrukem443 crypto_kem/ntruk
em443/ref 
gcc -march=native 
-mtune=native -O3 
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv 
-fPIC -fPIE (9.2.1 20191008) 
1569796 1.00 sntrup653 crypto_kem/sntru
p653/factored 
gcc -march=native 
-mtune=native -O3 
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv 
-fPIC -fPIE (9.2.1 20191008) 
992215 1.00 ntskem1264 crypto_kem/ntsk
em1264/opt 
gcc -march=native 
-mtune=native -O3 
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv 
-fPIC -fPIE (9.2.1 20191008) 
244617 1.00 r5nd0kem2iot crypto_kem/r5nd
0kem2iot/opt 
gcc -march=native 
-mtune=native -O3 
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv 
-fPIC -fPIE (9.2.1 20191008) 
312320 1.00 lightsaber crypto_kem/light
saber/portable 
clang -mcpu=native -O3 
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv 
-Qunused-arguments -fPIC 
-fPIE (Clang 9.0.0 
(tags/RELEASE 900/final)) 
489846260 1.00 sikep503 crypto_kem/sike
p503/opt 
clang -mcpu=native -O3 
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv 
-Qunused-arguments -fPIC 
-fPIE (Clang 9.0.0 
(tags/RELEASE 900/final)) 
298911 1.00 threebears624r2
cpax 
crypto_kem/three
bears624r2cpax/
opt 
gcc -march=native 
-mtune=native -O3 
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv 
-fPIC -fPIE 
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Table 14 
aarch64, pi4ubuntuserver64, crypto_kem compiler output 
Time Relative 
time 
Primitive Implementation Compiler 
28323497 1.00 bike2l1nc crypto_kem/bike2l1n
c/ref_ossl 
(BIKE_v1.0_Addition
al_11/18/2018) 
gcc -march=native 
-mtune=native -O3 
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv 
-fPIC -fPIE (9.2.1 20191008) 
836798 1.00 mceliece3488
64f 
crypto_kem/mceliece
348864f/vec 
clang -mcpu=native -O3 
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv 
-Qunused-arguments -fPIC 
-fPIE (Clang 9.0.0 
(tags/RELEASE 900/final)) 
402344 1.00 kyber512 crypto_kem/kyber51
2/ref 
clang -mcpu=native -O3 
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv 
-Qunused-arguments -fPIC 
-fPIE (Clang 9.0.0 
(tags/RELEASE 900/final)) 
63898904 1.00 frodokem640 crypto_kem/frodoke
m640/optimized 
clang -mcpu=native -O3 
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv 
-Qunused-arguments -fPIC 
-fPIE (Clang 9.0.0 
(tags/RELEASE 900/final)) 
6043445 1.00 hqc1281 crypto_kem/hqc1281
/opt 
gcc -march=native 
-mtune=native -O3 
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv 
-fPIC -fPIE (9.2.1 20191008) 
1582114 1.00 ledakem13 crypto_kem/ledakem
13/portableopt 
gcc -march=native 
-mtune=native -O3 
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv 
-fPIC -fPIE (9.2.1 20191008) 
457541 1.00 newhope512c
ca 
crypto_kem/newhop
e512cca/ref 
gcc -march=native 
-mtune=native -O3 
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv 
-fPIC -fPIE (9.2.1 20191008) 
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Table 14 continued 
Time Relative 
time 
Primitive Implementation Compiler 
534005 1.00 ntrukem443 crypto_kem/ntruke
m443/ref 
gcc -march=native 
-mtune=native -O3 
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv 
-fPIC -fPIE (9.2.1 20191008) 
1570757 1.00 sntrup653 crypto_kem/sntrup6
53/factored 
gcc -march=native 
-mtune=native -O3 
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv 
-fPIC -fPIE (9.2.1 20191008) 
992119 1.00 ntskem1264 crypto_kem/ntskem
1264/opt 
gcc -march=native 
-mtune=native -O3 
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv 
-fPIC -fPIE (9.2.1 20191008) 
245236 1.00 r5nd0kem2io
t 
crypto_kem/r5nd0k
em2iot/opt 
gcc -march=native 
-mtune=native -O3 
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv 
-fPIC -fPIE (9.2.1 20191008) 
311889 1.00 lightsaber crypto_kem/lightsa
ber/portable 
clang -mcpu=native -O3 
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv 
-Qunused-arguments -fPIC 
-fPIE (Clang 9.0.0 
(tags/RELEASE 900/final)) 
489766721 1.00 sikep503 crypto_kem/sikep5
03/opt 
clang -mcpu=native -O3 
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv 
-Qunused-arguments -fPIC 
-fPIE (Clang 9.0.0 
(tags/RELEASE 900/final)) 
298022 1.00 threebears62
4r2cpax 
crypto_kem/threebe
ars624r2cpax/opt 
gcc -march=native 
-mtune=native -O3 
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv 
-fPIC -fPIE 
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Appendix C 
The following tables include the SUPERCOP output for the amount of space in bytes for 
a secret key, public key, ciphertext, and session key for Raspberry Pi 3B+ and Raspberry Pi 4. 
aarch64, pi3bplusubuntuserver64, crypto_kem 
Table 15 
Secret key 
bytes system 
16 r5nd0kem2iot 
434 sikep503 
540 ledakem13 
701 ntrukem443 
804 threebears624r2cpax 
1518 sntrup653 
1568 lightsaber 
1632 kyber512 
1888 newhope512cca 
3165 hqc1281 
4964 bike2l1nc 
6452 mceliece348864f 
9216 ntskem1264 
19872 frodokem640 
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Table 16 
Public key 
bytes system 
342 r5nd0kem2iot 
378 sikep503 
611 ntrukem443 
672 lightsaber 
800 kyber512 
804 threebears624r2cpax 
928 newhope512cca 
994 sntrup653 
1271 bike2l1nc 
2080 ledakem13 
3125 hqc1281 
9616 frodokem640 
261120 mceliece348864f 
319488 ntskem1264 
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Table 17 
Ciphertext 
bytes system 
128 mceliece348864f 
128 ntskem1264 
394 r5nd0kem2iot 
402 sikep503 
611 ntrukem443 
736 kyber512 
736 lightsaber 
897 sntrup653 
917 threebears624r2cpax 
1040 ledakem13 
1120 newhope512cca 
1271 bike2l1nc 
6234 hqc1281 
9736 frodokem640 
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Table 18 
Session key 
bytes system 
16 frodokem640 
16 r5nd0kem2iot 
16 sikep503 
32 bike2l1nc 
32 mceliece348864f 
32 kyber512 
32 ledakem13 
32 newhope512cca 
32 ntrukem443 
32 sntrup653 
32 ntskem1264 
32 lightsaber 
32 threebears624r2cpax 
64 hqc1281 
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aarch64, pi4ubuntuserver64, crypto_kem 
Table 19 
Secret key 
bytes system 
16 r5nd0kem2iot 
434 sikep503 
540 ledakem13 
701 ntrukem443 
804 threebears624r2cpax 
1518 sntrup653 
1568 lightsaber 
1632 kyber512 
1888 newhope512cca 
3165 hqc1281 
4964 bike2l1nc 
6452 mceliece348864f 
9216 ntskem1264 
19872 frodokem640 
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Table 20 
Public key 
bytes system 
342 r5nd0kem2iot 
378 sikep503 
611 ntrukem443 
672 lightsaber 
800 kyber512 
804 threebears624r2cpax 
928 newhope512cca 
994 sntrup653 
1271 bike2l1nc 
2080 ledakem13 
3125 hqc1281 
9616 frodokem640 
261120 mceliece348864f 
319488 ntskem1264 
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Table 21 
Ciphertext 
bytes system 
128 mceliece348864f 
128 ntskem1264 
394 r5nd0kem2iot 
402 sikep503 
611 ntrukem443 
736 kyber512 
736 lightsaber 
897 sntrup653 
917 threebears624r2cpax 
1040 ledakem13 
1120 newhope512cca 
1271 bike2l1nc 
6234 hqc1281 
9736 frodokem640 
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Table 22 
Session key 
bytes system 
16 frodokem640 
16 r5nd0kem2iot 
16 sikep503 
32 bike2l1nc 
32 mceliece348864f 
32 kyber512 
32 ledakem13 
32 newhope512cca 
32 ntrukem443 
32 sntrup653 
32 ntskem1264 
32 lightsaber 
32 threebears624r2cpax 
64 hqc1281 
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Appendix D 
The following tables include the SUPERCOP public-key cryptosystem output for the 
secret key, public key, encrypting 0 bytes, encrypting 23 bytes, and encrypting many bytes for 
Raspberry Pi 3B+ and Raspberry Pi 4.  
aarch64, pi3bplusubuntuserver64, crypto_encrypt 
Table 23 
Secret Key 
bytes system 
26 ledapkc10 
493 r5nd1pke5d 
607 ntruees401ep2 
 
Table 24 
Public Key 
bytes system 
461 r5nd1pke5d 
557 ntruees401ep2 
4488 ledapkc10 
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Table 25 
Encrypting 0 bytes 
bytes system 
552 ntruees401ep2 
636 r5nd1pke5d 
8976 ledapkc10 
 
Table 26 
Encrypting 23 bytes 
bytes system 
529 ntruees401ep2 
636 r5nd1pke5d 
8953 ledapkc10 
 
Table 27 
Encrypting many bytes 
bytes system 
544 ntruees401ep2 
636 r5nd1pke5d 
4521 ledapkc10 
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aarch64, pi4ubuntuserver64, crypto_encrypt 
Table 28 
Secret Key 
bytes system 
26 ledapkc10 
493 r5nd1pke5d 
607 ntruees401ep2 
 
Table 29 
Public Key 
bytes system 
461 r5nd1pke5d 
557 ntruees401ep2 
4488 ledapkc10 
 
Table 30 
Encrypting 0 bytes 
bytes system 
552 ntruees401ep2 
636 r5nd1pke5d 
8976 ledapkc10 
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Table 31 
Encrypting 23 bytes 
bytes system 
529 ntruees401ep2 
636 r5nd1pke5d 
8953 ledapkc10 
 
Table 32 
Encrypting many bytes 
bytes system 
544 ntruees401ep2 
636 r5nd1pke5d 
4521 ledapkc10 
 
 
